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CIRCLES Spring 1992 Vol. I
CO UR TWA TCH by Tahirih Sadrieh*
Christine Franklin, Petitioner v. Gwinnett County Public Schools and William Prescott,
60 U.S.L.W. 4167 (February 26, 1992)
The Supreme Court declares that students can sue their schools for money damages under Title IX.
As a high school student, petitioner Christine Frandin, was subjected to continuous sexual harassment and was
coerced into sexual intercourse with Andrew Hill, a teacher, during her sophomore and junior years. Though the
school became aware of and investigated the teacher's sexual harassment of the petitioner and other female students,
no action was taken. Ms. Franklin was discouraged from pressing charges against Hill. The school closed its
investigation when the teacher agreed to resign on the condition that all matters pending against him would be
dropped.
The District Court and the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the sexual harassment claim on the ground that Title IX
does not authorize money damages. These courts relied on Drayden v. Needville Independent School Dist., 642 F.
2d 129 (5th Cir. 1981), which concluded that Title VI does not support a claim for money damages. Both courts
noted that judicial analysis of Title IX and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d, has
developed along similar lines. A second basis for the ruling was that Title IX was enacted under Congress' Spending
Clause power and that "[u]nder such statutes, relief may frequently be limited to that which is equitable in nature,
with the recipient of federal funds thus retaining the option of terminating such receipt in order to rid itself of an
injunction." Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Public Schools, 911 F. 2d 617, 621 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice White reasoned that a long line of cases have
presumed the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress expressly indicated otherwise. Respondents
and the United States as amicus curiae advanced three reasons why money damages should not be allowed in Title
IX cases. First, they claimed that such an award would violate the separation of powers by expanding the federal
courts' power into a sphere properly reserved to the Executive and Legislative Branches. The Court stated that while
finding a cause of action not previously authorized would increase judicial authority, the historic role of the courts is
to award all appropriate relief in cases brought into the court system.
Secondly, respondents and the United States argued that the normal presumption in favor of all appropriate
remedies should not apply because Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress' Spending Clause power. This
proposition would have expanded the ruling in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
18-19 (1981), which held that remedies under Spending Clause statutes are limited when the alleged violation is
unintentional. It does not apply to intentional violations. The Court stated that
the expansion was unwarranted since the justification for disallowing money Sexual
damages is not presented where the violations are intentional. When violations REMEDIES
are intentional, the entity has been placed on notice. Whereas, in cases of
unintentional violations, the receiving entity lacks notice that it will be liable for a
monetary award.
Finally, the United States asserted that the remedies permissible under Title
IX should be limited to back pay and prospective relief. The Court held that the
proper inquiry should be whether monetary damages provide an adequate p, Rsue Fture of...
remedy, and if not, whether equitable relief would be appropriate. In this case,
equitable remedies leave the petitioner without a remedy. Thus, the Court held
that to make Christine Franklin whole, damages must be awarded and are
available for an action brought to enforce Title IX.
